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The Hidden Tax Trap of I.R.C.
Section 6672
By STEPHEN J. VASEK*
INTRODUCTION
Two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
examined section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Slodov
v. United States, I the Court expressed its views on the personal
liability of business managers for unpaid taxes on employee
wages. Discharging such liability because of the personal bank-
ruptcy of the business manager was considered in United
States v. Sotelo.2 The focal point of these cases - section 6672
of the Internal Revenue Code- provides for the potential lia-
bility of business managers for the employees' share of taxes on
wages (hereinafter trust fund taxes):
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for,
and pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails
to collect such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to
evade or truthfully account for and pay over"' such tax, or
defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition
to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty
equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected,
or not accounted for and paid over. No penalty shall be im-
posed under section 6653 for any offense to which this section
is applicable.'
Although Slodov and Sotelo are helpful in understanding
the scope and effect of section 6672, they do not lessen its
hidden-trap character. The following scenario is used to illus-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S., B.A. 1961, J.D. 1966,
Northwestern University; LL.M. 1969, Harvard University.
The author expresses his appreciation for the research assistance of Penny Warren,
third-year law student at the University of Kentucky.
98 S. Ct. 1778 (1978).
98 S. Ct. 1795 (1978).
I.R.C. § 6672. A proposed amendment to § 6672 passed Congress on October 14,
1978. H.R. 7320, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); CONGRESSIONAL INDEx CCH 34,512 (Nov.
1, 1978). The proposed amendment would add a subsection providing procedures for
contesting personal liability for the trust fund taxes and for obtaining a stay of collec-
tion.
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trate the nature of that trap and the consequences of falling
into it.
Mylo Unwary, President of Aba Corporation, has been
working fourteen hours per day for the last two years in an
attempt to save Aba from financial collapse. Investors, credi-
tors, employees of Aba, and many others have been depending
on him. However, four months ago Mylo recognized that Aba
Corporation could not be saved, and he attempted to wind
down Aba in such a manner so as to cause the fewest number
of hardships. Employees were given notice of the status of the
corporation so that they would have time to search for new
jobs. Existing raw materials were converted into finished goods
and sold in an effort to minimize the corporation's losses. Mylo
relinquished the Aba Corporation to the trustee in bankruptcy
in better condition than it had been in two years. The corpora-
tion had sufficient funds to pay all tax liabilities although not
all taxes had been paid: all tax returns had been filed and the
trustee in bankruptcy was aware of those that had not been
paid. Mylo had discussed the problem of the unpaid taxes with
an IRS agent a year earlier, and the agent told Mylo that it was
a good idea to try to save the business.' Mylo suggested that
the IRS seize some corporate assets before bankruptcy, but the
IRS did not act.
The trustee in bankruptcy paid the secured claims and the
first, second, and third priority claims. The size of these claims
resulted in a shortage of cash to pay all of the taxes, a fourth
priority claim. 5 The remaining funds were used to pay a propor-
I See, e.g., Tozier v. United States, 16 A.F.T.R.2d 5626, 5630 (W.D. Wash. 1965),
in which - with IRS approval - business operations were continued in an effort to
reduce hardships on employees in an economically depressed area.
I Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1976). The order of payment of claims is as
follows: secured claims are paid first, followed by costs and expenses of administration
(first priority), wages and commissions (second priority), costs of setting aside a wage
earner plan, a bankruptcy discharge, or an arrangement with creditors (third priority),
and taxes which became legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States
or any state or subdivision thereof (fourth priority). Perfected tax liens are ranked
above the first priority as secured claims, but tax liens on personal property must be
perfected by possession or they are postponed until after payment of the first and
second priorities. J. MOORE & L. KING, COLL=R ON BANKRUPTCY 64.403 at 2160 (14th
ed. 1975). Taxes on wages earned prior to bankruptcy but unpaid at the time of the
filing of bankruptcy are given second priority, the same as the unpaid wages to which
they relate. Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43 (1974); In re Armadillo Corp., 410 F.
Supp. 407 (D. Colo. 1976).
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tionate part of state taxes and a proportionate part of federal
taxes. 6 The money paid for federal taxes was applied to the
non-trust fund portion of the corporation's tax liability.7 The
corporation could not designate the application of tax pay-
ments; they were neither voluntary nor timely.s Because few,
if any, of the payments to the IRS were allocated toward the
trust fund tax liability, Mylo Unwary was left personally liable
for the unpaid trust fund taxes under I.R.C. section 6672.1
What course is open to Mylo? Assuming there is some
question as to Mylo's liability, he may be able to negotiate his
liability with the IRS10 If he does not settle, he may pay his
Only taxes that are not dischargeable in bankruptcy are given fourth priority
status, according to 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1976). 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1976) specifically makes
"taxes which became legally due and owing by the bankrupt. . . within three years
preceding bankruptcy" non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. Also, 11 U.S.C. § 35
(a)(1)(e) (1976) makes taxes that the bankrupt has collected and withheld from others
nondischargeable. Dischargeable taxes are given parity with general unsecured claims
after all priorities. CoLLiER, supra, 64.404 at 2176.
1 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1976); CoLLER, supra note 5, 64.401
at 2151.
" In determining the amount of the 100 percent penalty to be assessed
in connection with employment taxes, any payment made on the corporate
account involved is deemed to represent payment of the employer's portion
of the liability (including assessed penalty and interest) unless there was
some specific designation to the contrary by the taxpayer.
IRS Policy Statement P-5-60 (MT 1218-56, approved Nov. 5, 1965), reprinted in 1
(C.C.H.) I.R.M. 1305-25-26; see also 4 (C.C.H.) I.R.M. 21,410 at 5544.32. The court in
United States v. DeBeradinis, 305 F. Supp. 944, 952 (D. Conn. 1975), affl'd, 538 F.2d
315 (2d Cir. 1976), stated that for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to have
applied payments to the trust fund tax liability "would have been to shirk his responsi-
bility to insure that the maximum amount of assessed tax be collected." This reasoning
would support allocation of receipts to all non-trust fund taxes, including corporate
income taxes, before any receipts are allocated to the liability for trust fund taxes.
I The power of designation, "while absolute if timely, evaporates upon the expira-
tion of the relevant period for filing a timely return." Hirsch v. United States, 306 F.
Supp. 170, 173 (S.D. Ohio 1975). See also Monday v. United States, 421 F.2d 1210,
1218 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970), in which the court allowed the IRS
to disregard directions from the bankruptcy referee regarding the application of pay-
ments to trust fund liabilities.
I Recent substantial raises in F.I.C.A. taxes, see I.R.C. § 3101, are likely to in-
crease the number of cases where the employer is faced with the dilemma of closing
the plant and terminating his employees or keeping the plant open and risking personal
liability for unpaid trust fund taxes.
1, Hearings at the district and appellate levels were possible in most cases prior
to October 2, 1978. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-26, 1969-2 C.B. 308; Rev. Rul. 61-27, 1961-2
C.B. 563; Rev. Rul. 57-26, 1957-2 C.B. 1093. See generally 4 (C.C.H.) I.R.M. 21,401-
21-487 MT 5500-25. Effective October 2, 1978, the district conference level of appeal
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liability for the payroll taxes of a particular employee and sue
for a refund." The IRS will counterclaim for the remainder of
the outstanding tax and thus allow the court to determine the
extent of Mylo's liability. The court would probably find Mylo
personally liable for the entire amount. Driven into personal
bankruptcy, the final blow is dealt to Mylo when he learns that
his indebtedness for the 100% penalty is not dischargeable in
bankruptcy.' 2 Mylo, now bankrupt, but still in debt, can con-
sider himself lucky if no criminal charges are brought against
him under I.R.C. sections 7202 and 7215. Unfortunately, this
hope offers Mylo no succor. He purchased 5,000 pounds of dy-
namite and was last seen en route to Washington, reading a
copy of "Pick Up Where Guy Fawkes Left Off" and muttering
something about "those - feds."
Variations on this scenario are marfy. Mylo Unwary might
be the treasurer of a corporation, the manager of a partner-
ship's financial affairs, an employee responsible for collecting
and paying over taxes, or a lender or surety of a loan which is
used for the payment of wages.' 3 It is possible that a lawyer or
accountant for the business could be liable for malpractice in
not advising his client of the tax liability of persons responsible
for collecting and paying over taxes withheld from employees.
To the IRS, Mylo Unwary is Sly Highroller, a slick financier
who has refused to pay the .trust fund taxes in order to obtain
an interest-free loan from the federal government or to give
preference to creditors over the federal government. The assess-
ment of the 100% penalty under section 6672 generally does not
depend on whether the responsible person is Mylo Unwary or
Sly Highroller.
The problem of tax deficiencies for unpaid taxes on em-
was eliminated. See News Release, IR-2038 55,489 (P-H) notifying of the amendment
of the Statement of Procedure Rules, 26 C.F.R. part 601.
" See 4 (C.C.H.) I.R.M. 21,416 at 5547.6. H.R. 7320, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978),
which passed Congress on October 14, 1978, would amend § 6672 to provide for a stay
of collection of the penalty if the taxpayer pays the minimum amount required to
commence a court proceeding, files a claim for refund, and furnishes a bond equal to
one and one-half times the amount of any unpaid penalty.
11 United States v. Sotelo, 98 S. Ct. 1795 (1978). See also Lackey v. United States,
538 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1976); In re Murphy, 533 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1976).
Is See text accompanying notes 16-64 for a discussion of who qualifies as a respon-
sible person.
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ployee wages is of enormous magnitude. In fiscal year 1976,
there were 28,599 businesses delinquent in such taxes in the
Chicago district of the IRS. This statistic translated into $88.9
million of unpaid trust fund taxes which resulted in section
6672 penalty assessments against individuals connected with
535 of those businesses. 4 Whether the exceptional remedy
given the government under section 6672 to pursue individuals
for the unpaid trust fund taxes is necessary to protect federal
revenues cannot be answered without an examination of the
applications of section 6672 and possible defenses to such pen-
alty assessments. This article will examine these issues and
comment on what should be done to reconcile the need to pro-
tect federal revenues with the need to be fair to individuals
responsible for collecting and paying over trust fund taxes. Part
I examines the question of who can be liable under section
6672, Part II examines the concept of "willfulness" which is a
prerequisite for liability, and Part I examines possible re-
forms.
L THE RESPONSIBLE PERSON
The person liable for the 100% penalty under section 6672
is "[a]ny person required to collect, truthfully account for,
and pay over" the trust fund taxes.'5 The term "person" is
further defined in section 6671(b) to include "an officer or em-
ployee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partner-
ship, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty
to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs."
A. The Scope of the Responsible Person Concept
When the IRS is in doubt as to the identity of the person
responsible in a corporate setting, the service's policy is to
"look to the President, Secretary and the Treasurer of the Cor-
poration as responsible officers."'" However, the court decisions
11 UNTD STATES CoMPTRoLLER GENERAL OPINION B-137762, CCH Standard Fed-
eral Tax Reports 6614 at 71,438 (May 11, 1977) [hereinafter cited as CoMPTRouzR
OPION].
z I.R.C. § 6672.
' IRS Policy Statement P-5-60 (MT 1218-56 approved Nov. 5, 1965), reprinted
in 1 (C.C.H.) I.R.M. 1305-25,26. See also McCarthy v. United States, 437 F.2d 961,
1978-79]
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reject the proposition that mere corporate officeholding is a per
se basis for liability under section 6672.' 7 Other factors are
considered in determining liability. Thus, in Fried v. United
States" the court held that the corporation's president was not
the responsible person when he only owned sixteen percent of
the stock and the treasurer owned fifty-one percent. In the
Fried case the president had tried to pay the taxes but the
treasurer, whose signature was also required on all checks, re-
fused to counter-sign the check.
Although corporate officeholding is some indication of a
person's responsibility, nonofficeholders and nonemployees
have also been held liable for the penalty under section 6672.'1
The proviso in section 6671(b) that "person" includes "an offi-
cer or employee. . . under a duty" has been held to be exem-
plary rather than inclusive." For example, in United States v.
Graham2' the Ninth Circuit held that a corporate director who
was neither an officer nor an employee could be held liable for
the 100% penalty since the board of directors had not delegated
responsibility to some corporate officer. Further, the board of
directors had acted to give preference to corporate obligations
other than the tax obligations, and the particular board mem-
ber held liable for the tax penalty knew of the unpaid tax
liability. In Mulcahy v. United States22 the court concluded
967-68 (Ct. Cl. 1971), stating that a "founder, chief stockholder, president and member
of the board of directors of a corporation. . . is rebuttably presumed to be the person
responsible under § 2707 [former § 6672]."
,1 "[M]ere office holding of and by itself does not render one responsible for the
collection and paying over of employee withholding taxes." Bauer v. United States,
543 F.2d 142, 149 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (citing Monday v. United States, 421 F.2d 1210, 1214
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970)).
, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9372 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
" See, e.g., Mueller v. Nixon, 470 F.2d 1348 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
949 (1973); McCarthy v. United States, 437 F.2d 961 (Ct. Cl. 1971); White v. United
States, 372 F.2d 513 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d
26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); United States v. Graham, 309 F.2d 210
(9th Cir. 1962); Regan & Co. v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 470 (E.D.N.Y. 1968);
Melillo v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); Tiffany v. United States,
228 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1963); National Bank of Commerce v. Phinney, 65-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9512 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
2 Meuller v. Nixon, 470 F.2d 1348, 1350 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 949
(1973).
21 309 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
" 237 F. Supp. 656 (S.D. Tex. 1964).
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that a person could be subject to the 100% penalty even if he
was merely counsel for the corporation and not an officer or
employee. In Howard v. United States"s the court found that a
husband (president) and his wife (secretary-treasurer) were not
responsible persons despite the fact that they owned 100% of
the corporation's outstanding stock. The wife's father, who had
organized the corporation but was apparently not an officer,
had completely dominated the wife and her husband and in
fact controlled the financial affairs of the corporation. Presum-
ably, the father was the responsible person.24
Responsibility has also been extended to a lender or surety
of a loan. Lenders and their employees may be held liable for
the 100% penalty under either section 3505 or section 6672.
Section 6672 has been applied to lenders and their employees
as well as sureties when those persons have effective control
over the borrower.2 Thus in Mueller v. Nixon,21 lender's em-
ployee who was put in charge of borrower's operations was
found to be the person responsible for the nonpayment of taxes
withheld from borrower's employees. Section 3505 makes lend-
ers and sureties liable for the borrower's trust fund taxes in one
of two situations. Liability will result if they pay the borrower's
employees' wages directly or through an agent and neither they
nor the agent pays the trust fund taxes or if they lend directly
to the borrower for the specific purpose of paying wages and
they have actual knowledge that the borrower will not pay the
trust fund tax.Y
In general, the IRS does not attempt to assess the penalty
against partners or sole proprietors since they usually are per-
sonally liable for the unpaid taxes.2 However, such assess-
= 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-6228 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
21 No penalty was assessed against wife's father, presumably because he died
shortly after the corporation's withholding tax liability accrued.
1 See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 504 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1974) (sole issue was
whether lender can be a responsible person); Mueller v. Nixon, 470 F.2d 1348 (6th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 949 (1973); Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 422
F.2d 26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. 937 (1970). See also Goebert v. United States,
412 F. Supp. 356, 360 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (citing Werner v. United States, 374 F. Supp.
558, 563 (D.Conn. 1974)), for distinction between creditors who apply pressure and
those who take effective control.
- 470 F.2d 1348 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 949 (1973).
V See Treas. Reg. § 31.3505 (1978) for examples of the application of these rules.
28 COMPTROLLER OPIMON, supra note 14, at 71,438.
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ments have been made, presumably to prevent discharge in
bankruptcy of the debt for the delinquent taxes."
B. Defenses to Imposition of Responsible Person Status
1. Lack of Control Over Fiscal Affairs
Determination of who is a responsible person involves "a
search for a person with ultimate authority over expenditures
of funds.""0 The responsible person is the one with fiscal control
or, more explicitly, the authority to direct payment of credi-
tors. Ministerial employees and nominal corporate officers are
normally not responsible persons because they are powerless to
control the preference of one creditor over another. Such per-
sonnel usually have authority to select a particular creditor
over another only by exerting influence on some other person
in the corporate structure. 3
Application of these principles of control to specific situa-
tions is difficult because of the nebulous nature of power and
control in corporate structures. To aid in identification of the
"responsible persons," the district court in Datlof v. United
States32 set out seven factors: 1) what the individual's duties
were as outlined by the corporate by-laws, 2) whether the indi-
vidual had the authority to sign company checks, 3) whether
the individual signed the tax returns of the firm, 4) whether the
individual paid creditors other than the United States, 5)
whether the individual was a corporate officer, director and/or
principal stockholder, 6) whether the individual hired and dis-
21 United States v. Sweetser, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9470 (M.D. Pa. 1977). See also
Kaufman v. Scanlon, 245 F. Supp. 352 (E.D.N.Y. 1965), in which the taxpayer was
held to be a responsible person in a business which held itself out as a corporation but
was apparently never incorporated. In Isaac v. United States, 26 A.F.T.R.2d 70-5396
(C.D. Cal. 1970), the IRS attempted to assess the penalty against an individual when
a partnership of two corporations had failed to collect withholding taxes.
' Bauer v. United States, 543 F.2d 142, 148 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (citing White v. United
States, 372 F.2d 513, 517 (Ct. Cl. 1967)). In determining who has ultimate authority
over the expenditure of funds, courts seek to ascertain "who has the final word as to
what bills should or should not be paid, and when." Adams v. United States, 504 F.2d
73, 75 (7th Cir. 1974) (citing Turner v. United States, 423 F.2d 448, 449 (9th Cir. 1970)).
Also, "'final' means significant rather than exclusive control." Id. at 75 (citing Dudley
v. United States, 428 F.2d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 1970)).
3 United States v. Abrahams, 312 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
" 252 F. Supp. 11, 32-33 (E.D. Pa.), affl'd, 370 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 906 (1967).
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charged employees, and 7) whether the individual controlled
the financial affairs of the firm in general. Similar lists have
been used by other courts in identifying the responsible per-
sons.
33
Some individuals have successfully contended that their
authority and responsibility were only in the technical or sales
areas and not in the fiscal area. For example, in reaching the
conclusion that taxpayer was not a responsible person and was
"at best only a nominal figure of authority in the fiscal area,"u
the court in Bauer v. United States considered the following:
1. Taxpayer's training and work experience of over thirty
years was entirely technical and not of a fiscal nature.
2. As manager of operations, taxpayer was in charge of
production, quality control, and scheduling. All accounting
and financial affairs were in the hands of the treasurer who
reported directly to the president.
3. Taxpayer was appointed rather than elected to the
board of directors which had no formal meetings in the tax year
in question other than the annual board meeting at the begin-
ning of the year. The business affairs of the corporation were
conducted in a lax, informal manner, without the customary
corporate formalities.
4. No formal financial reports were prepared for directors
on a regular or current basis during 1970, nor were they issued
information concerning delinquent employee withholding
taxes.
5. The executive committee formed in January, 1970, was
not properly formed since it contained only two director-
members and the by-laws required three.
6. The treasurer was in charge of financial records and
disbursements and reported directly to the president. The
treasurer and the president (but not taxpayer) met with per-
sonnel from the IRS to discuss the corporation's tax delinquen-
cies. Taxpayer knew of the meetings with the IRS but was not
aware of the specific nature of the tax problem, nor of the
3 See, e.g., Goebert v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Hoeniger
v. United States, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9296 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Braden v. United States,
319 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 912 (1971).
u Bauer v. United States, 543 F.2d 142, 148-49 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
1978-79]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
specific results of the meetings. Taxpayer did not learn of the
tax problem with regard to the employee withholding tax delin-
quencies until December 1970 (the end of the period in ques-
tion).
7. Taxpayer never prepared, signed, or filed any tax re-
turns, nor did he participate in the preparation of financial
statements.
8. Taxpayer was generally aware of the deterioration of the
corporation's financial condition, but was not consulted in
making arrangements with creditors other than for his techni-
cal expertise regarding supplies. Supply orders were routed to
the treasurer or president for approval because of the corpora-
tion's poor financial condition.
9. Taxpayer never signed a corporate check or had control,
custody or possession of the corporate books, records or check-
books, nor did he ever get involved in any corporate banking
transactions. The court stated that in every case in which it
had found the individual was a responsible person, the individ-
ual had actually signed or cosigned corporate checks.,
10. Taxpayer had nothing to do with payroll: he was not
authorized to act in that area either by the by-laws or in actual
iractice. 31 That the taxpayer in Bauer was the corporation's
vice-president, a substantial shareholder, a member of the
board of directors, the manager of operations, a member of the
executive committee and a signatory on signature cards on two
of the corporation's bank accounts was not, in light of his lim-
ited technical responsibilities, sufficient to make him a respon-
sible person.
Taxpayers have prevailed in other cases when the taxpayer
was a "field man" for a construction corporation with no re-
sponsibility for financial decisions37 and when taxpayer was in
charge of sales and personnel but not financial management.3
Another aspect of the lack of control over fiscal affairs
defense is the contention that taxpayer's fiscal authority did
-' Id. at 145-48. But see Brown v. United States, 464 F.2d 590, 591 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 933 (1973), in which the court held that the lack of authority to
sign corporate checks will not insulate the taxpayer from liability.
31 543 F.2d at 149.
1 Stanton v. United States, 37 A.F.T.R.2d 76-1427 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
38 Bellah v. Patterson, 197 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ala. 1961).
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not encompass fiscal authority over payroll taxes. In Bernardi
v. United States3' a man named Lutz, who was vice-president,
board member, shareholder, and director of operations, was
authorized to sign corporate checks and did so. He had actually
signed the employer's quarterly tax returns for the quarters at
issue, he had intimate knowledge of the corporation's financial
problems, and he had met with the accounts receivable factor
to discuss credit arrangements. Even though the court found
that Lutz and two other officers had often acted jointly in
running the corporation, the court concluded that Lutz had no
responsibility for paying the payroll or determining creditor
priorities and had nothing to do with keeping tax records or
preparing tax returns. In finding that Lutz was not a responsi-
ble person the court noted that "[i]f Lutz had decided that
withheld taxes should be segregated or paid over to the govern-
ment immediately, he could have implemented that decision
only by persuading [the treasurer or the chairman of the
board] or both, to segregate funds or to pay the taxes.""
The willingness of a court to examine closely the individ-
ual's actual authority was also shown in Builder's Finance v.
United States." The controller of the corporation knew of the
trust fund tax delinquency and had authority to cosign checks,
but he was held not to be a responsible person since his author-
ity and duties related only to non-payroll accounts payable.
2. Delegation of Fiscal Authority Defense
The situations in which an individual never had fiscal au-
thority over payroll taxes must be distinguished from the cases
in which a person has such authority and it is delegated. No
cases were found in which a shareholder or member of the
board of directors was held liable for the section 6672 penalty
solely on the basis of such status.
A director could be a responsible person only if "the board
of directors had the final word as to what bills should or should
1' 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9170 (N.D. IMI. 1973), affl'd, 507 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
" Id. 9170 at 83,215. See also Campbell v. Nixon, 207 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich.
1962).
1 352 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
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not be paid and when.' 2 The test to determine a director's
liability is similar to that discussed in the preceding section of
this paper:" whether the director actually exercised control in
determining which creditors should be paid, regardless of
whether the director could have exercised such control. Delega-
tion of fiscal management authority by the board of directors
appears to insulate them effectively from liability as responsi-
ble persons.
Non-directors have not been very successful in escaping
responsible person status by having delegated responsibility to
someone else. For example, in Bedford v. United States" the
court stated, "Nor may such a responsible person avoid his
responsibility by delegating it to a subordinate employee."' 5
The First Circuit,. in Harrington v. United States, reasoned
that delegation would not relieve a corporate president who
had the responsibility and authority to avoid the default." In
United States v. Sweetser the court concluded that delegation
of duty to withhold and pay over the taxes to the president was
not a sufficient defense to liability under section 6672 since the
"right" to exercise control remained with the secretary-
treasurer." In Lawrence v. United States, the court held that
a delegation of responsibility was irrelevant as long as the
power to revoke the delegation remained in the grantor. 8
In a few cases the delegation of the duty to withhold and
pay the taxes has insulated the person delegating the authority
from liability because the failure to pay the taxes was not will-
ful on the delegator's part. In Wiggins v. United States"5 a
president/treasurer, who had delegated to his bookkeeper the
duty to withhold and pay over the taxes, was held not liable.
" United States v. Graham, 309 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Wilson v.
United States, 250 F.2d 312, 316 (9th Cir. 1957)).
" See notes 30-41 and accompanying text supra.
" 39 A.F.T,R.2d 77-1246 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
"Id. at 77-1249. The jury in situations discussed by the court inferred that Bed-
ford was a corporate officer. Id. at 77-1249, 77-1251.
504 F.2d 1306 (1st Cir. 1974).
396 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
299 F. Supp. 187, 190 (N.D. Tex. 1969). In Lawrence, taxpayer's widow -
executrix of his estate - was held liable because her husband had loaned money to
an employer and assumed financial control and his control had passed to his estate.
1g 188 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Tenn. 1960).
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In Daniels v. United States" the corporation's founder who had
assigned the duties of return preparation to the secre-
tary/treasurer was not liable. In these two cases the respective
courts found that the corporate officers' failure to pay the taxes
had been not willful, even if they were responsible persons.
Similarly, in Adams v. United States,51 the court explicitly
recognized that a person with legal and actual authority to
control disbursements is a "responsible person" even if he does
not take an active interest in and defers to others financial
control but that an indifferent, careless, and casual manner
resulting in his ignorance of the tax liability makes his nonpay-
ment of the tax liability not willful. The willfulness aspect of
the delegation of authority defense will be analyzed further in
section II of this article, dealing with willfulness.
C. Liability Involving Multiple Responsible Persons
It is clear that more than one person may be responsible
for an unpaid trust fund tax. 2 The IRS may seek to recover the
entire penalty from one person; it is not under any duty to
charge all responsible persons or all who are alleged to be re-
sponsible persons.13 One responsible person cannot implead
others to get a court determination of his liability,54 nor can the
person ultimately held liable sue other responsible persons di-
rectly for contributions toward his liability. 5
Although the IRS will assess the section 6672 penalty only
against those persons from whom the tax is collectible - taking
into account such factors as the age and health of the taxpayers
- a fairer approach would be to enact legislation allowing
impleader. Impleader would permit a fairer allocation of liabil-
, 20 A.F.T.R.2d 5490, 5491 (W.D. Tenn. 1967).
" 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-1174, 75-1177 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
52 See, e.g., Builder's Finance v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Mich.
1970).
DiBenedetto v. United States, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9503 (D.R.I. 1974).
- Id. 9503 at 87,332. Rule 14 impleader is inappropriate since the liability of
responsible persons is to the government and not to other responsible persons. Geiger
v. United States, 41 A.F.T.R.2d 78-1230 (D. Md. 1978).
0 Cohen v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mich. 1975). See also DiBene-
detto v. United States, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9503 (D.R.I. 1974), for the proposition
that there is no right of contribution among willful tortfeasors.
" COMROLLER OPimON, supra note 14, at 71,438.
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ity among all responsible persons. Liability could be joint and
several so that the government would not lose revenues if one
or more of the responsible persons were unable to pay his entire
share. The apportionment of liability would be a difficult but
not insurmountable task. Liability could be based on the de-
gree of willfulness of each responsible person. The benefits from
such impleader and contribution rules would be: 1) all respon-
sible persons will be encouraged to take their responsibilities
seriously and would not rely on the wealth of any particular
responsible person, 2) the possibility of biased selection of re-
sponsible persons to pursue will be eliminated, and 3) the
financial burdens of liability will be more fairly allocated.
D. When Does Responsibility Begin and End?
A distinct aspect of the responsible person question is
whether an individual is liable for the section 6672 penalty even
though he was not responsible for the employee's withholding
tax throughout the entire period during which the taxes were
to be collected, accounted for, and paid over. This problem
arises due to the time lags inherent in the collection process.
The employer has the duty to withhold the employees' share
of taxes at the time the wages are paid.57 The withheld taxes
are paid quarterly and reported on form 941, returns being due
on April 30, July 31, October 31, and January 31. s Monthly or
weekly deposits of withheld taxes may be required depending
on their amount."
Section 6672 states that "Any person required to collect,
truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this
title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account
for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner
to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof," shall
I.R.C. §§ 3102(a) and 3402(a).
Treas. Reg. §§ 31.6011(a)-1(a)(1) and 31.6011(1)-4 (1978); Treas. Reg. §
31.6151-1(a) (1978).
5, Treas. Reg. § 31.6302(c)-l(a)(1)(i)(a) (1978). In general, deposits of withheld
taxes in bank qualified as a depository for federal taxes are required within three
banking days if the cumulative undeposited taxes for the quarter are $2000 or more
on the 7th, 15th, 22nd or last day of any month. If at the end of any month the
cumulative undeposited taxes are more than $200 but less than $2000, such taxes must
be deposited by the 15th of the following month. Id. § 31.6302(c)-l(a)(1)(i)(b) (1978).
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be liable for the 100% penalty. 0 The Supreme Court, in Slodov
v. United States,"1 held that the phrase "required to collect,
truthfully account for, and pay over" did not define responsible
person but merely clarified the type of duty to which the pen-
alty was applicable.2 Thus, a person who had any one of the
three enumerated duties (collection, accounting, or payment)
would be a responsible person. For example, a corporate officer
who resigns after net wages are paid but before any withholding
returns are filed and before any taxes are to be paid or depos-
ited would be a responsible person with respect to the withheld
taxes on the net wages.63 Similarly a corporate officer who as-
sumes his office after net wages are paid could also be a respon-
sible person. 4 Although a person who has less than all three of
the enumerated duties is a responsible person, the failure to
pay taxes may or may not have been "willful" on his part. The
effect of the timing of the responsible person's tenure on will-
fulness is discussed in section II of this article, following a more
general discussion of willfulness.
I. WILLFULNESS
A. Definitions of "Willfulness"
In Slodov v. United States the Supreme Court interpreted
"I.R.C. § 6672.
" 98 S. Ct. 1778 (1978).
2 Id. at 1787.
' See, e.g., Korman v. United States, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-424 (E.D.N.Y. 1974);
Bernardi v. United States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9170 (N.D. Ill. 1973), affl'd, 507 F.2d
682 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Long v. Bacon, 239 F. Supp.
911 (S.D. Iowa 1965). See also Slodov v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1778 (1978).
"1 Slodov v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1778 (1978). See also Mueller v. Nixon, 470
F.2d 1348 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 949 (1973); Astleford v. United States,
35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-1522 (D. Minn. 1975); Rubin v. United States, 380 F. Supp. 1176
(W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 515 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1975); Stake v. United States,
347 F. Supp. 823 (D. Minn. 1972); Louisville Credit Men's Ass'n v. United States, 32
A.F.T.R.2d 73-6114 (E.D. Ky. 1970); Kaufman v. Scanlon, 245 F. Supp. 352 (E.D.N.Y.
1965).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Slodov, a few courts had held that
taxpayer was not a responsible person with respect to taxes on wages paid before he
became a corporate officer. McCullough v. United States, 462 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1972);
Howard v. United States, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-6228 (N.D. Ohio 1976); In re Slodov, 419
F. Supp. 64 (N.D. Ohio 1975), reu'd, 552 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 1778
(1978).
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the willfulness proviso in section 6672 as requiring some sort of
personal fault on the part of the responsible person:
Section 6672 cannot be read as imposing upon the responsible
person an absolute duty to "pay over" amounts which should
have been collected and withheld. The fact that the provision
imposes a "penalty" and is violated only by a "willful fail-
ure" is itself strong evidence that it was not intended to im-
pose liability without personal fault. . . .The Government's
concession - that § 6672 does not impose a duty on the
responsible officer to use personal funds or even to liquidate
corporate assets to satisfy the tax obligations - recognizes
that the "pay over" requirement does not impose an absolute
duty on the responsible person to pay back taxes. 5
In contrast, the dissent defined "willful" as "a conscious act or
omission which violates a known legal duty."6 According to the
dissent, the "willfulness" requirement is met if the responsible
person consciously chose to pay creditors other than the United
States with full knowledge of the outstanding tax obligations."
It can be assumed that the Slodov majority would not
require a finding of "bad" motive, such as an intent to defraud,
on the part of the responsible person in order to find his actions
willful." Although the Court's interpretation of "willfulness" in
terms of personal fault resembles the "reasonable cause" de-
fense that some courts have used in interpreting "willfulness"
under section 6672, the similarity is probably not important.
The essence of the reasonable cause defense is that the person
charged to withhold, collect, and pay over taxes is excused
because he has reasonable cause to avoid performance of his
duties.69 The reasonable cause defense has been rejected by
most courts and its applicability has been severely restricted
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the only circuit which
98 S. Ct. at 1788-89.
" Id. at 1794.
87 Id.
" For cases which reject the need for a finding of bad motive, see Hartman v.
United States, 538 F.2d 1336, 1341 (8th Cir. 1976) (acknowledging the wide acceptance
of the conscious act definition applied in Monday); Kalb v. United States, 505 F.2d
506, 511 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 979 (1974); Monday v. United States, 421 F.2d
1210, 1216 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970). See also Rev. Rul. 54-158, 1954-
1 C.B. 247; Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 83 (1968).
0 Newsome v. United States, 431 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1970).
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still expressly recognizes the reasonable cause defense.70 The
Fifth Circuit has so restricted application of the defense that
its decisions would probably not differ if it expressly rejected
the reasonable cause defense.71
Prior to Slodov most courts determined the willfulness
issue according to a standard comparable to that stated by the
dissent in Slodov. Willfulness was viewed as a voluntary, con-
scious, and intentional failure to collect, truthfully account for
or pay over the taxes withheld from employees, or a payment
of creditors other than the government with knowledge that the
trust fund taxes were unpaid.72
The dissent in Slodov interpreted the majority opinion as
rejecting the "conscious act or omission" test and suggested
that the majority was adopting some vague test of immoral
conduct in determining willfulness. 73 Although the majority did
emphasize Slodov's lack of "personal fault,"7 the crucial dif-
ference between the majority and dissenting opinions was in
defining Slodov's legal duties. 75 While emphasis on personal
fault as opposed to "conscious acts" arguably should produce
different results in certain fact situations, 76 the following dis-
7 Newsome, id. at 746-48, limited the applicability of the reasonable cause de-
fense. For cases that have rejected the reasonable cause defense, see Harrington v.
United States, 540 F.2d 1306, 1315-16 (1st Cir. 1974); Monday v. United States, 421
F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1970); and Bloom v. United States, 272 F.2d 215, 225 (9th Cir.
1959). In Newsome, reasonable cause did not exist when financial statements prepared
by an accounting firm overstated accounts receivable and the responsible person be-
lieved sufficient accounts receivable would be collected by the end of the quarter to
pay the taxes.
11 No Fifth Circuit cases were found in which the reasonable cause defense was
successful in shielding the responsible person from liability. In Cash v. Campbell, 346
F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1965), the court suggested that the reasonable cause defense would
have been applicable had taxpayer's accountant and attorneys advised taxpayer not
to pay taxes as they became due. Such advice might shield taxpayer from liability even
under the stricter test of "conscious knowledge" of taxes owing.
For a discussion of the confusing history of the reasonable cause defense outside
the Fifth Circuit, see Frazier v. United States, 304 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1962).
n See note 68 supra for supporting cases.
" 98 S. Ct. at 1794.
7, Id. at 1788.
" The dissenting opinion would have based Slodov's liability on his conscious
failure to pay the outstanding tax liability out of business receipts collected after he
assumed control. The majority held there was no duty to pay over after-acquired
receipts.
71 See text accompanying notes 135-46 infra for an examination of situations in
which different results might arise.
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cussion will demonstrate that the results of the two tests will
be similar in most cases.77
B. Willfulness Distinguished from Negligence
Although willfulness requires an awareness of the unpaid
tax liability, a responsible person cannot put on blinders and
escape tax liability. Negligence in not learning of the tax liabil-
ity is not willfulness,7" but willfulness does exist if there has
been a "reckless disregard for obvious or known risks" or a
"failure to investigate or to correct mismanagement."79
An example of the distinction can be seen in United States
v. Leuschner.0 Nonpayment of the trust fund taxes was held
to be not willful when the responsible person (director and
general manager of a corporation) relied upon his controller to
keep the books, file the tax returns, and pay all creditors. The
individual charged with responsibility did not learn of the un-
paid tax liability until creditors forced the closing of the busi-
ness by attachment of assets. This occurred after the due date
for paying the taxes. Nonpayment was found to be not willful
even though the individual knew about the company's pressing
needs for cash and had cosigned company checks and tax
returns. The court believed his statements that he signed blank
checks and tax returns for the controller to fill out. The lack of
knowledge of the liability precluded his actions from being will-
ful.
However, when he continued to conduct the same business
through a new corporation in the same manner as he had oper-
ated the old corporation, the court did not allow a second bite
T See text accompanying notes 85-134 infra in which it is demonstrated that the
results will most often be similar.
11 See, e.g., Kalb v. United States, 505 F.2d 506, 511 (2d Cir. 1974); Dudley v.
United States, 428 F.2d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Leuschner, 336
F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1964); Mazo v. United States, 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9325 (S.D.
Ga. 1977); Goebert v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 356, 361 (E.D. Pa. 1976); and
Hoeniger v. United States, 37 A.F.T.R.2d 76-1011, 76-1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
7' Kalb v. United States, 505 F.2d 506, 511 (2d Cir. 1974). See also cases cited in
note 78 supra. But see Adams v. United States, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-1174, 75-1177 (D.
Ore. 1975), in which the court concluded that the responsible person had not acted
willfully "however indifferent and careless and casual" he was about his responsibili-
ties.
. 336 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1964).
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from the apple. Even though he made no inquiries as to
whether taxes were paid by the new corporation and allegedly
did not learn of the unpaid taxes until the IRS levied on his
personal bank account, the court held that the nonpayment of
taxes by the new corporation was willful. From his experience
with the prior corporation, the responsible person was held to
be under a duty to see that the taxes were paid by the new
corporation.81 His actions with respect to the unpaid taxes of
the first corporation were characterized as negligence and
therefore not willful; his actions with respect to the unpaid
taxes of the new corporation qualified as a reckless disregard
for obvious and known risks and thus constituted a voluntary,
conscious, and intentional failure to pay.2
The distinction between negligent failure to learn of tax
liabilities and reckless disregard for obvious or known tax lia-
bilities has been articulated under the "conscious act" stan-
dard of willfulness.83 The Supreme Court's "personal fault"
concept of willfulness84 should continue the recognition of this
distinction, since both negligence and reckless disregard are
different degrees of personal fault.
C. The Duty to Withhold
1. The Willfulness Implicit in the Payment of Wages When
There Are Insufficient Funds to Pay Taxes on Those Wages
In Sorenson v. United States5 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the payment of net wages at a time when
there were insufficient funds to pay the taxes on those wages
constituted a willful failure to withhold, collect, and pay over
.0 Id. at 248. See also Fitzgerald v. United States, 407 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (E.D.
Ky. 1976), in which the court held that the responsible person had an affirmative duty
to investigate or correct mismanagement of the withholding taxes after learning that
the taxes had not been paid.
52 336 F.2d at 248. The issue of whether a taxpayer's conduct is mere negligence
or is recklessness is a question of fact on which the taxpayer (plaintiff in refund suits)
has the burden of proof. See, e.g., Lawrence v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 187, 191
(N.D. Tex. 1969).
See cases cited in notes 78-82 supra.
s See text accompanying notes 65-77 supra for a discussion of the personal fault
concept.
- 521 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1975).
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the taxes under section 6672.86 The use of all available funds
to pay net wages was seen as a preference of wage claims over
tax claims. The court concluded that the responsible person
should have prorated the available funds between wages and
the accompanying tax.8"
In Slodov v. United States"8 the Supreme Court found that
the reasoning in Sorenson had been unnecessary to impose lia-
bility on Sorenson. Sorenson had used his personal funds rather
than corporate funds to pay the net wages,89 thus giving rise to
liability for his failure as third party payor to withhold and
collect taxes as they were paid." The third party payor of net
wages is personally liable under section 3505 (as is an employer
under sections 3102(b)' and 3404) for taxes which should have
been withheld from wages. The liability of responsible persons
under section 6672 only arises when the failure to collect, with-
hold, or pay over results from "willful" conduct of the responsi-
ble person. The personal liability of the employer or third party
payor is absolute, unlike the liability under section 6672. Thus,
it is arguable that Sorenson was not liable under section 6672.
Slodov thus leaves unclear whether payment of net wages
when there are insufficient funds to pay the corresponding
taxes constitutes "willfulness" under section 6672. Willfulness
would not be present in this situation if there were no duty to
retain funds equal to the employee's share of taxes on the wages
paid. To hold otherwise would be to hold a person liable for his
failure to do something that he was not required to do.
2. The Duty to Retain Funds
The argument that there is an obligation to fund the liabil-
ity for withheld taxes at the time wages are paid has support.
Several I.R.C. sections indicate a Congressional desire to have
funds available and on hand to pay the tax liability. Sections
3102(a) and 3402(a) do not expressly require that funds equal
" Id. at 328. Accord, Bloom v. United States, 272 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1959); United
States v. Sweetser, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9470 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
" 521 F.2d at 328 n.3.
- 98 S. Ct. 1778 (1978).
0 Id. at 1787 n.14.
"Id.
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to the withheld amounts be retained in any particular form.'
However, use of the terms "collect and withhold" in section
6672 suggests that the employer's duty is actually to retain
something as opposed merely to avoid paying to the employee
money that represents the withheld taxes.12 Parts of the legisla-
tive history of these provisions also can be construed to require
a withholding or collection of funds. 3 Artfully ambiguous regu-
lations require that the F.I.C.A. and income taxes withheld be
paid over in money and arguably require that the withholding
liability be funded with money. 4 The legislative history of sec-
" I.R.C. § 3102(a) refers to the collection of F.I.C.A. taxes by deducting the
amount of such taxes from wages. I.R.C. § 3402(a) refers to deducting and withholding
income taxes on employee wages. Although the duty to "collect by deducting" and to
"withhold" are consistent with the mere duty not to pay over to the employee, common
usage would dictate the interpretation that some physical thing must be collected or
withheld, i.e., the property which would otherwise have been paid over to the em-
ployee.
See In re Haynes, 88 F. Supp. 379, 385 (D. Kan. 1949), in which the court con-
cluded that "since the officer is directed by the statute to deduct the withholding tax
from the employee's wages on a percentage basis, the payment of wages to employees
charges bim with having in his hands the withholding tax." (Emphasis added.)
" See the discussion in the preceding footnote.
In general, the committee reports paraphrase the language in the statutes. But
see S. REP. No. 221, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (to accompany H.R. 2570) (May 19,
1943) and H.R. REP. No. 510, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (to accompany H.R. 2570) (May
28, 1943). Both reports state:
Withholding under the new system will involve very considerable amounts
of tax moneys which will be withheld from the wages of employees. These
funds will not belong to the employers. It may well prove desirable to provide
a method by which these funds will be turned over by employers, and reach
their way into the Treasury, more rapidly and more currently than. . . on
a quarterly basis. The purpose of section 1631 is to provide a flexible method
by which this objective may be accomplished without placing undue strain
on the administrative tax collection machinery.
S. REP. No. 221 states:
In order to enable employers to deposit the amounts withheld from employ-
ees with the Government at an early date, the Secretary of the Treasury may
authorize incorporated banks. . .to receive the amounts withheld at such
times and under such conditions as he may prescribe. If the Secretary pro-
vides proper depositaries for these funds, the employers will not have to hold
the funds in their possession until their returns are filed with the collector.
Id. at 7.
" Treas. Reg. § 31.3402(a)-1(c) 1971 states:
[An employer is required to deduct and withhold the tax notwithstanding
the wages are paid in something other than money. . . and to pay over the
tax in money. If wages are paid in property other than money, the employer
should make necessary arrangements to insure that the amount of tax re-
quired to be withheld is available for payment in money.
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tions 7512 and 7215 is consistent with the theory that there is
a general requirement that funds be physically retained when
net wages are paid.95 The language of section 7501, which indi-
cates that taxes are a "special fund in trust," and its legislative
history appear to support the proposition that there is a duty
to withhold funds when wages are paid."
The regulations fail to state whether these arrangements must be made before pay-
ment of wages or merely before the time for payment of the taxes.
Treas. Reg. § 3102-1 (1971) states: "The employer is required to collect the tax,
notwithstanding the wages are paid in something other than money, and to pay over
the tax in money." While both regulations require the employer "to collect the tax,
.... and to pay over the tax in money," the first cited regulation does not contain
commas. Whether the clause "in money" is intended to modify the duty to deduct and
withhold as well as the duty to pay over is questionable. The regulations are character-
ized as "artfully ambiguous" based on the suspicion that the drafters of the regulation
were unsure of the scope of the duty to collect but wanted to suggest that it was a duty
to withhold or collect money.
1 I.R.C. §§ 7512 and 7215 were both enacted in 1958. Under § 7512 the IRS may,
under certain conditions, require that an employer do three things: (1) collect taxes
withheld on wages and collect certain excise taxes, (2) deposit them in a separate bank
account within two banking days, and (3) keep the deposits in that account until
payment to the United States. Section 7215 imposes criminal penalties for the viola-
tion of § 7512. Exceptions to imposition of the § 7215 penalty are provided for situa-
tions when there was reasonable doubt that the law required the tax to be collected
(e.g., if it is questionable whether the wage recipient was an employee or independent
contractor) and when the lack of funds was due to circumstances beyond the person's
control after the wage payment (e.g., theft, embezzlement, destruction of the business
by flood, fire or other casualty, or the failure of a bank in which the person had
deposited the funds prior to transferring them to the trust account for the government).
Section 7215 specifically provides that a lack of funds existing immediately after the
payment of wages (whether or not created by the payment of such wages) shall not be
considered to be circumstances beyond the control of a person. See S. REP. No. 1182,
85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2187, 2192.
After summarizing the liability of responsible persons under §§ 6672 and 7202 of
the Code, the Senate Report states: "The new feature of the penalty provided by the
new section 7215 is that it is not limited to the 'willful' failure cases to which the other
penalties are applicable." Id. at 2191. This statement in the Senate Report indicates
that the willfulness defense under § 6672 may be more readily available to taxpayers
than the defenses to criminal liability under § 7215. On the other hand, although
liability under § 6672 should probably not be found as readily as liability under § 7215,
it is consistent with the legislative history of § 7215 to treat the lack of funds created
by payment of net wages as violative of the duties imposed by both § 6672 and § 7215.
H I.R.C. § 7501 provides that "the amount of tax so collected or withheld should
be held to be a special fund in trust. . . ... The legislative history of that section says:
Under existing law the liability of the person collecting and withholding the
taxes to pay over the amount is merely a debt, and he cannot be treated as
a trustee . . . . Section [607] of the bill [§ 7501 of present law] impresses
the amount of taxes withheld or collected with a trust . ...
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3. The Scope of Duty
Assuming there is a duty to withhold funds, it is necessary
to define "funds" in order to determine the scope of the duty
to collect and withhold." Since there is no duty to segregate
withheld funds, 8 the definition of "funds" will also determine
the extent of permissible use of withheld funds.
Although the Supreme Court refused in Slodov to decide
whether section 7501 can serve as an independent basis for
liability of responsible persons, it did conclude that section
7501 "may be regarded as informing the scope of the duty
imposed by § 6672."l The duties imposed on the responsible
person under section 6672 are thus presumed to be the same as
the duties of the employer to collect and withhold under section
3102(a) and 3402(a), as modified by section 7501.1°° Prior to the
enactment of section 7501 the liability of the person collecting
S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1934).
Trust law requires that "every trust must have some property as its subject-
matter." G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS 69 (5th ed. 1973). Further:
[t]he res of a trust may be a claim against the settlor or against a third
person, but difficulties arise if an attempt is made to have a trustee hold a
claim against himself. . . in trust since [this] involves the legal impossibil-
ity of the same person being obligor and obligee ....
Id. at 71-72. Also, a debtor usually owes his creditor any money but a trustee controls
definite or definable property for the benefit of his beneficiary. Id. at 76. Based on this
analysis of trust law it would appear that "the amount of tax so collected or withheld"
was viewed by Congress as involving the withholding of specific property.
" For example, is the duty satisfied by retaining sufficient assets to cover the
liability for withheld taxes or must cash be retained?
" "There is no general requirement that the withheld sums be segregated from
the employer's general funds, however, or that they be deposited in a separate bank
account until required to be paid to the Treasury." Slodov v. United States, 98 S. Ct.
1778, 1783 (1978). That § 7501 deems the amount withheld to be a "special fund"
appears to contradict the lack of any duty to segregate withheld sums. Segregation of
assets to fund a liability "is accomplished by transferring assets from a general asset
account, such as cash or marketable securities, to a new specially labelled account,
such as 'Special Fund'." R. AMORY & C. HARDEE, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTrING 130 (3d
ed. Herwitz & Trautman 1959). Perhaps the lack of any duty to segregate can be based
on the failure of the IRS to issue regulations requiring segregation and consequent long-
standing practices.
" Slodov v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1778, 1789 n.18.
'" For a discussion of these sections, see notes 91 and 96 supra. There is nothing
in the Code to suggest that the duty to withhold is different for the employer corpora-
tions than it is for responsible persons, even though liability of the corporation is
determined under I.R.C. §§ 3102(b) and 3403 whereas a different liability for responsi-
ble persons (for willful failure) is set out in I.R.C. § 6672.
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and withholding taxes took the form of a debt.'01 Section 7501
deems the withheld funds to be a trust; the person collecting
and withholding the taxes thus becomes a trustee. 02 But the
trustee of the withheld tax funds is unlike most other trustees
in that he has no duty to segregate the withheld funds from
"the employer's general funds." ' 3
For what funds is the section 7501 trustee responsible?
Since the trustee is under no duty to segregate withheld funds
into a specific account, the definition could be as broad as the
total assets of a business or as narrow as cash or its equivalent.
In an accounting sense, the term "funds" is ambiguous."4
As stated in a leading accounting treatise:
In a sense, funds may be defined as any positive asset or net
asset classification. For practical purposes, however, the fol-
lowing comprise all the viable alternative concepts
[alternative to the working capital concept] of funds: (1)
total current assets, (2) total money (quick) assets, (3) net
money (quick) assets, (4) total assets, and (5) cash and its
equivalent.'05
If the term "funds" is given the broadest meaning, total
assets, the duty of the employer to withhold funds would ap-
parently be satisfied as long as the business had assets immedi-
ately after the payment of wages equaling the liability for the
withheld taxes. The duty of accounting would be satisfied by
merely recording on the employer's books the liability for the
unpaid withheld taxes.
If the term "funds" were given the meaning of net assets
(total assets less total liabilities), the duty to withhold would
be satisfied if the business had sufficient net assets to cover the
liability for withheld taxes. The choice of the net asset defini-
tion could be premised on the theory that withholding taxes
requires the withholding of assets in excess of those claimed by
'" See S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1934) (quoted in note 96 supra).
,,' See S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1934) (quoted in note 96 supra).
"3 Slodov v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1778, 1783 (1978).
' See sources cited in note 105 infra.
'1 S. DAVIDSON, HANDBOOK OF MODERN AcCOUNTING 4-25 (chapter by Anton and
Jaedicke 1970). The legal and common usage definitions of "funds" also show a variety
of slightly different meanings. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIoNARY 802 (4th ed. 1951);
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 921 (1966).
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other creditors. It is suspected by this author that in most cases
where withheld funds are not paid over to the Government,
there were no net assets (liabilities exceeded assets) at the time
net wages were paid. Thus acceptance of this definition of
funds would usually mean that the responsible person
breached his duty by failing to withhold funds at the time net
wages were paid.
Funds could be defined as total, current assets. Since the
liability for withheld taxes is a current liability, only current
assets will satisfy the withholding duty. By definition, assets
which are not current assets would not be available for the
payment of the liability for the withheld taxes."' A further
narrowing of this definition of funds to working capital (net
current assets or the excess of current assets over current liabil-
ities) could be justified by the contention that the duty im-
posed is to withhold funds which are available for the payment
of the withheld tax liability. Such funds are those in excess of
funds claimed by other creditors.
Funds could also be 'defined as total money assets. Inven-
tories and prepaid expenses are excluded from the total current
assets (without reduction for liabilities) to arrive at total
money assets.' 7 Such a definition of funds could further be
narrowed to "cash or its equivalent" or net money assets. Net
money assets are total money assets minus current liabilities.
Cash or its equivalent is total money assets (without reduction
for liabilities) minus accounts receivable.' 8 Cash or its equiva-
lent will usually consist only of cash on hand and in banks and
marketable securities.
Although a broad definition of "funds" (e.g., total assets)
would make the duty to withhold easy to meet, it could result
in more frequent failure to pay over. This would result because
no identifiable fund, other than "total assets," would be re-
garded as being held for the payment of withholding taxes.
I" In general, current assets are those funds which can be "considered to offset
maturing debt which has properly been set up as a current liability." CoMMrrrA ON
AccoUNTnNG PROCEDURE, AMERICAN INSTITtE OF AccouNTANTs, AccoUTrING REsEARC
BUETN No. 43, ch. 3, § A(6) n.1 (1953). Liability for withheld taxes would be a
current liability. Id. § A(7).
I" S. DAVIDSON, supra note 105, at 4-25.
IN Id.
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Such funds would be used in ordinary business operations and,
if no funds were available to pay taxes, the withheld funds
would have been depleted. Since there is no duty to segregate
withheld funds, the use of funds (total assets) in business
operations would not constitute a breach of duty by the respon-
sible person. The resulting failure to pay over would be non-
willful. To hold the responsible person liable for risking total
assets in the business operations would contradict the lack of
a duty to segregate such assets and, in effect, turn the responsi-
ble person into a guarantor of the tax liability.
A definition of funds narrower than total assets would both
increase the probability of pay over and impliedly restrict the
responsible person's right to use such funds. Since identifiable
funds would be withheld, it is more likely that they would be
held intact until time to pay over than would withheld "total
assets." Also, any conversion of such funds into non-fund busi-
ness assets could result in section 6672 liability. Thus, if funds
are defined as total money assets (cash, securities and accounts
receivable), expenditure of total money assets for raw materials
or inventory would constitute a conversion of such funds into
non-fund assets and the responsible person would be liable for
willfully depleting such funds if total money assets were re-
duced below the amount of the outstanding trust fund tax lia-
bility. Defining funds as total money assets would allow the
responsible person to convert cash into securities or accounts
receivable (since there is no duty to segregate withheld funds),
but not to convert total money assets into non-money type
assets. Viewed in this manner, the duty to withhold funds is a
duty to set aside those funds until the time to pay them over.
The lack of a duty to segregate withheld funds allows changes
in the composition of such funds, but not conversion of such
funds into non-fund assets if such conversion depletes the fund
below the amount of the trust fund tax liability.
The narrowest definitions of the term "funds" appear to
be net money assets and cash or its equivalent. It is difficult
to determine as a general rule whether the adoption of the net
money assets or the cash or its equivalent concept of funds
would provide the IRS with greater security for the trust fund
tax liability. Net money assets might (non-willfully) disappear
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if accounts receivable became uncollectable.105 Cash or its
equivalent might be (non-willfully) consumed if marketable
securities decline in value. Acceptance of an even narrower
definition, e.g., net cash or its equivalent, would mean that the
responsible person would be liable for failure to withhold if he
withheld funds but they were subject to superior claims of
other creditors at the time they were withheld and were subse-
quently claimed by such creditors. Since the priorities of var-
ious claims may be in doubt or may be satisfied out of future
receipts, it is arguable that, as a policy matter, the responsible
person should not be held liable for withholding funds in which
others had priority if the priority of those claims is in doubt.
Conservative tax planning requires that the duty to with-
hold be interpreted by responsible persons as a duty to with-
hold cash or its equivalent. Such a narrow interpretation of
funds ensures that an identifiable fund will be retained by the
responsible person. Most existing court decisions are consistent
with this interpretation of the duty to withhold.110 As a conse-
10 See, e.g., Newsome v. United States, 431 F.2d 742, 746 (5th Cir. 1970), wherein
the responsible person had relied on the collection of accounts receivable which had
been overstated by the accountants by about $100,000. '
M The requirement that cash or its equivalent be withheld is consistent with the
notions that withheld funds not be subjected to common business risks and that the
voluntary preference of creditors other than the government which results in a lack of
funds to pay the tax liability subjects the responsible person to § 6672 liability. Most
courts adhere to these ideas. See, e.g., Sorenson v. United States, 521 F.2d 325, 327-
28 (9th Cir. 1975); Newsome v. United States, 431 F.2d 742,748 (5th Cir. 1970); United
States v. DeBeradinis, 395 F. Supp. 944, 951 (D. Conn. 1975), affl'd, 538 F.2d 315 (2d
Cir. 1976); Korman v. United States, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-424, 75-425 (E.D.N.Y. 1974);
Bernardi v. United States, 33 A.F.T.R.2d 74-523, 74-526 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd per curiam,
507 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1974). The shortcoming of these cases is that they fail to recog-
nize certain defenses; in Sorenson, for example, the court failed to recognize that the
willful failure was a failure to withhold cash or its equivalent and not the preference
of other creditors over the government. See Slodov v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1778,
1787 & n.14 (1978).
If there were no duty to withhold funds, or the term "funds" included more than
just cash or its equivalent, use of all of the business' cash to pay net wages would not
by itself constitute a willful failure to collect and withhold. In this situation the respon-
sible person would have satisfied his duty to withhold by not paying the amount of
withheld taxes to the employee and by having on hand sufficient funds to pay the
liability (e.g., total assets, net assets, net worth, etc.). Since there is no duty to segre-
gate withheld funds, the responsible person would not violate any duty if he used funds
in the business operations. By recording the liability for the withheld taxes on the
employer's books and reporting the liability on the Quarterly Return, the responsible
person would satisfy his duty to account truthfully for these taxes. At the time deposit
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quence of this interpretation, responsible persons would be lia-
ble under section 6672 for a willful failure to withhold when
they use all available cash to pay net wages or if they
"willfully" dissipate cash and cannot pay withholding taxes.
Reasonable doubt regarding the existence of a duty to with-
hold, for example, if there is ambiguity about the wage earner's
status - whether employee or independent contractor -
should make failure to withhold non-willful."' However, con-
servative tax planning requires that cash or its equivalent be
withheld even if there is such reasonable doubt; otherwise, the
taxpayer will have the burden of establishing the reasonable-
ness of such doubt to the IRS or the courts at a later date.
D. The Duty to Pay Over
A willful failure to pay over withheld funds gives rise to
section 6672 liability. Of course, a willful failure to withhold
establishes an independent basis for section 6672 liability. If a
responsible person willfully failed to withhold funds at the time
net wages were paid he would be liable under section 6672. The
willfulness or non-willfulness of his failure to pay over would
of payment is required, the responsible person would have the duty to use "funds" as
defined above (i.e., net assets, net worth, etc.) to meet the deposit or payment require-
ments. In order to avoid emasculating § 6672, the courts would probably limit the lack
of any duty to pay over the after-acquired funds, see notes 120-22 and accompanying
text infra, to Slodov-type situations where the responsible person assumed control after
net wages had been paid. If the responsible person were allowed to use withheld funds
in the business operation, e.g., by adoption of a net worth definition of funds, his use
of funds in such manner would not constitute a violation of his duties, but should
impose on him a duty to use all such funds available at the time the duty to deposit
or pay over arises, even if some of the funds were generated after the wages were paid.
Because of the inconsistency between the lack of duty to pay over after-acquired funds
and a broad definition of "funds," it is arguable that "funds" must be interpreted as
cash or its equivalent.
"' Reasonable doubt as to the existence of a duty to withhold is a defense to
criminal liability for failure to withhold under I.R.C. §§ 7512(b), 7215. Since such
failure to withhold is not a conscious violation of a known duty, failure to withhold
under such circumstances is not willful. See the discussion of the definition of willful-
ness at text accompanying notes 65-83 supra and the discussion of reliance on subordi-
nates, accountants, and attorneys at text accompanying notes 123-26 infra. See also
Revenue Act of 1978, H.R. 13511, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) 530, reprinted in (C.C.H.)
Standard Federal Tax Reports No. 36 (Extra edition Aug. 10, 1978), which restricts
IRS challenges to an individual's treatment of another as an independent contractor
unless the taxpayer has no reasonable basis for not treating such individual as an
employee. This restriction is in force until 1980. This provision sets out specific statu-
tory standards for treating an individual as an independent contractor.
HIDDEN TAX TRAP
be irrelevant. Whether the responsible person's failure to pay
over withheld funds is willful depends on whether he had with-
held funds to pay over. If such funds were available at the time
to pay over, failure to pay over would be willful. If such funds
were not available, the willfulness of the failure to pay over
would depend upon whether any depletion of withheld funds
during the responsible person's tenure was willful or non-
willful. The responsible person could be either the same person
who withheld funds (the former manager), or a person who
assumed control after net wages had been paid (a new man-
ager).
The non-willful depletion of withheld funds defense is
likely to have a very limited application because of the short
time period between the payment of wages and the time for
depositing or paying over withheld funds."' Whether a willful
failure to deposit funds is conceptually characterized as a will-
ful failure to pay over or as a willful breach of the continuing
obligation to withhold funds should not matter. Only a non-
willful dissipation of funds between the time wages are actually
paid and the time for deposit or pay over of withheld taxes
should constitute a defense to section 6672 liability.
1. Non-Willful Depletion of Withheld Funds by Old
Managers
The legislative history of section 7215 suggests several situ-
ations in which the dissipation of withheld funds before the
date for depositing or paying over such funds could be consid-
ered non-willful for section 6672 purposes."' Theft or embezzle-
ment of the withheld funds, destruction of the business by
flood, fire or other casualty, or the failure of a bank in which
" See note 59 supra and accompanying text for the applicable timetables.
"I See note 95 supra for the legislative history of § 7215 which discusses the
interpretation of "circumstances beyond the control" of the person responsible for trust
fund taxes. Although not directed at the interpretation of "willfulness" under § 6672,
willfulness under § 6672 should not be interpreted more narrowly than "circumstances
beyond his control" is interpreted for purposes of § 7215. See S. REP., supra note 95.
One of the purposes in enacting § 7215 was to eliminate, in criminal cases, some of
the "weaknesses" in § 6672. It was the intent of Congress not to allow defenses to §
7215 criminal liability which are allowable as defenses to civil liability under § 6672.
Thus, all the defenses to criminal liability under § 7215 presumably should be avail-
able as defenses to § 6672 civil liability.
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withheld funds were deposited constitute a non-willful loss.'
The Slodov opinion indicates that the responsible person does
not have personal fault for favoring the superior interests of
other creditors over the government." 5 Thus, this situation is
another that results in the nonwillful depletion of funds.
"Surely Congress did not intend to hammer the responsible
person with the threat of heavy civil and criminal penalties to
pay over proceeds in which the Code does not assert a priority
interest.""' Thus, the failure of the responsible person to pay
over funds in which other creditors have superior interests may
not be a willful failure to pay over and the use of funds to pay
such creditors may not be a willful depletion of withheld funds.
The scope of the duty to withhold may have some bearing on
whether these depletions of funds are non-willful. Thus it
should be the withheld funds that are destroyed by fire, embez-
zled, or paid to superior creditors before such depletion is non-
willful. For example, if the diLty is to withhold cash and only
the inventory is destroyed, the duty to pay over should still be
present.
Other situations in which the willfulness of a depletion of
funds depends upon the scope of the duty to withhold are: (1)
when the funds are invested in marketable securities which
decline in value, and (2) when the accounts receivable of the
business become uncollectable. If the duty to withhold is a
duty to withhold cash or its equivalent, then the decline in
value of the securities would be a non-willful depletion. If the
duty to withhold is a duty to withhold only cash, a decline in
the value of the securities would be irrelevant to the question
of failure to pay over taxes: the cash should still be available,
regardless of the securities market. If the duty to withhold is
merely the duty to withhold net money assets, uncollectability
of accounts receivable would make a duty to pay over non-
willful. However, if it is a duty to withhold cash or its equiva-
lent, the uncollectability would be irrelevant: A failure to pay
over due to accounts receivable being collectible would not
excuse a responsible person if he had a duty to withhold cash
or its equivalent.
m See notes 95 and 113 supra for discussion of this non-willfulness.
" Slodov v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1778, 1791 (1978).
1 Id.
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It should be noted that the non-willful depletion of with-
held funds defense is only valid to the extent that there has
been a reduction of the funds below the amount of taxes with-
held. The duty to deposit and pay over would remain as to any
funds that were on hand when the duty to collect and withhold
accrued and still in existence at the time the duty to deposit
or pay over arises."7
2. Non-willful Depletion of Funds by New Managers
Slodov held that persons who assume control after net
wages have been paid but when the withheld funds are not
available to pay the tax liability from those wages are not liable
under section 6672.118 The new managers did not have the duty
to withhold funds, they were not responsible for any depletion
of withheld funds (since the funds had already been depleted),
and they had no duty to pay over after-acquired funds. The
lack of withheld funds may have been caused by the failure of
the old managers to withhold funds or by their depletion of
withheld funds. In either case, the prior responsible persons
would be liable under section 6672 if their failure to withhold
or the prior depletion of withheld funds was willful.
If withheld funds were available to pay the trust fund tax
liability at the time the new responsible person assumed con-
trol, he would be liable if he willfully allowed such funds to be
depleted and the tax liability went unpaid.' The willfulness
in this situation would be determined according to the princi-
ples outlined in the previous section of this article dealing with
depletion of funds by old managers.
"I Withheld funds can be conceptualized as an unsegregated portion of the corpo-
ration's total cash and securities. If the withheld taxes were $20 and the total cash and
securities were $100, embezzlement of $85 cash would leave the responsible person
liable under § 6672 only for the remaining $15 of trust funds. See Newsome v. United
States, 431 F.2d 742, 746 (5th Cir. 1970).
I' 98 S. Ct. at 1791.
II Cf. Slodov v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1778, 1791 (1978):
We hold that a 'responsible person' under § 6672 may violate the 'pay
over' requirement of that statute by willfully failing to pay over trust funds
collected prior to his accession to control when at the time he assumed
control the corporation has funds impressed with a trust under § 7501. . ..
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3. Funds Acquired After Depletion of Withheld Funds
In Slodov, a person who acquired a business with a liabil-
ity for unpaid withholding tax and insufficient funds to pay
those taxes had no liability under section 6672 for failing to use
after-acquired funds to pay the tax liability. The Court refused
to impose a trust on after-acquired property 12 and refused to
impress a fiduciary duty on the responsible person to pay this
after-acquired cash. 21 Even those who are not new managers
are under no duty to pay over after-acquired property.12 Thus,
an old manager who withheld taxes need not pay over after-
acquired property provided that the withheld funds were not
willfully depleted by him. If the back taxes are not voluntarily
paid in this situation, the IRS must use its collection proce-
dures to recover the tax from the employer.
E. Reliance on Others as a Defense to Willfulness
1. Reliance on Subordinates, Accountants, and Attorneys
In many instances an individual charged with responsibil-
ity under section 6672 will claim that any dereliction on his
part was not "willful" because his actions were based on the
advice of others. For example, advice of counsel to the effect
that there was no tax liability was held to preclude a finding
that the failure to pay over the withheld taxes was willful.123
The same holding was extended to a person who acted upon the
advice of his attorney and a special deputy tax collector to the
effect that he was not required to collect the tax.1 21 Similarly,
when the responsible person delegated to subordinates the duty
to collect and pay over the taxes, some cases have held the
failure to pay over the taxes was not a willful act by the respon-
sible person.12 The above cases consistently require an aware-
In d. at 1789.
" Id. at 1789-90.
"2 Id. at 1790-91 (neither § 6672 nor § 7501 imposes a trust on after-acquired cash).
' Cross v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 311 F.2d 90 (1962).
The court of appeals reversed the lower court on the grounds that the party charged
with responsibility had been told by the IRS that a tax liability did in fact exist. Thus,
it appears that the advice of counsel, standing alone, would have been an acceptable
defense.
12, Gray Line Co. v. Granquist, 237 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1956).
,21 See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Tenn. 1960); Dan-
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ness of the tax liability and an awareness of nonpayment prior
to a finding of willful conduct. By contrast, another case which
involved a responsible person who knew of the existence of the
unpaid tax liability but relied on the advice of others not to pay
the tax held that nonpayment by the' responsible person was
willful. 28
This distinction between reliance on advice as to the exist-
ence of the unpaid tax and reliance on others as to the need to
pay over the tax when due is consistent with both the conscious
act and personal fault concepts of willfulness. There is no per-
sonal fault if one does not know that a tax obligation exists or
that an existing one is unpaid. Similarly, there is no conscious
act if one does not have full knowledge of the outstanding tax
obligations. Neither concept would excuse one who consciously
chose not to collect or pay the taxes when due.
2. Reliance on Representations by IRS Agents
a. Representations Regarding the Existence or Minimization
of Tax Liability
Reliance on statements by IRS agents that no tax liability
exists, like reliance upon subordinates and other experts, can
serve as a basis for showing lack of willfulness.'1 There should
be no personal fault or conscious act when the responsible per-
son has reasonably relied on an IRS agent as to the nonexist-
ence of any tax liability.12s
iels v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 644 (D. Ariz. 1956). See also Adams v. United
States, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-1174, 75-1177 (W.D. Wis. 1974). But see Lawrence v. United
States, 299 F. Supp. 187, 191 (N.D. Tex. 1969), and the text accompanying notes 78-
84 supra for a discussion regarding reckless disregard for obvious or known risks.
Reasonable doubt that the law required the responsible person to collect or with-
hold the taxes (if it were questionable whether the wage recipient were an employee
or an independent contractor, for example) should be a defense to willfulness under §
6672. See also note 95 supra for the legislative history of I.R.C. § 7215 and for other
examples of non-willful conduct.
"I Hirsch v. United States, 396 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Ohio 1975). See also Newsome
v. United States, 431 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1970), in which liability was found. Accoun-
tants had overstated accounts receivable by about $100,000 and the responsible person
used corporate funds to pay other creditors, relying on future collection of the $100,000
receivables to pay trust fund taxes.
'1' See Gray Line Co. v. Granquist, 237 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1956).
£2 See text accompanying notes 65-77 supra for discussion of these two standards
of liability.
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A more difficult question is presented when the IRS agent
tells the responsible person that he may continue in business
and the IRS will reduce or eliminate his personal liability.
Taxpayers have been successful in avoiding section 6672 liabil-
ity when an IRS agent agreed to minimize taxpayer's liability
by applying all tax collections toward the liability for withheld
taxes and the collections were not so applied. '29 Similarly, a
taxpayer should be protected from section 6672 liability if the
IRS agrees to minimize his personal liability by attaching cor-
porate assets and the IRS subsequently fails to attach the cor-
porate assets.1 30
Two possible reasons for protecting taxpayers exist in
these situations. First, the government should be estopped
from enforcing taxpayer's liability to the extent taxpayer's reli-
ance on the agent's promises caused taxpayer to forego an op-
portunity to extinguish his liability. The difficulty with this
estoppel theory is that estoppel will not lie against the govern-
ment for statements by a government agent which exceed his
authority. In Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill,'3' a federal
statute expressly prohibited the benefits (insurance on re-
seeded crops) promised by the government agent. Although no
statute expressly prohibits IRS agents from minimizing liabil-
ity through the specific application of tax collections, the at-
tachment of assets, or even broad "hold harmless" representa-
tions, IRS agents have "no powers to suspend the liability of
the tax statutes.' 3 2 However, since the IRS does have discre-
tion regarding the application of tax payments and the use of
enforcement procedures, they should at least be held to the
promises they had authority to make.
The second reason for relieving taxpayer of liability that
' Slodov v. United States, 552 F.2d 159, 162-63 (6th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
issues, 98 S. Ct. 1778 (1978); McKenzie v. United States, 536 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1976).
See also Tozier v. United States, 16 A.F.T.R.2d 5626, 5633 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
"I See McCarty v. United States, 437 F.2d 961 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Tozier v. United
States, 16 A.F.T.R.2d 5626 (W.D. Wash. 1965). In many cases the taxpayer has not
been successful in establishing the existence of such misleading representations. See,
e.g., Monday v. United States, 25 A.F.T.R.2d 70-548, 70-553 (7th Cir. 1970); Spivak
v. United States, 370 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. DeBeradinis, 36
A.F.T.R.2d 75-5109, 75-5116 (D. Conn. 1975).
13 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
"I Carrol v. United States, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9656 at 85,199 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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he might have extinguished but for his reliance on representa-
tions by an IRS agent lies in the responsible person's lack of
personal fault. The ultimate nonpayment of the liability for
withheld taxes was caused by the taxpayer's reliance on the
representations of the IRS agent, not the personal fault of the
responsible person. Although taxpayer, by allowing the tax de-
ficiency to arise, was guilty of a "conscious violation of a known
duty," he might have corrected that violation by using avail-
able cash or liquidating assets to get cash to pay the outstand-
ing liability. Reliance on the express promises of the IRS agent,
which the IRS failed to fulfill, was the final determinative
cause for nonpayment of the trust fund tax liability. Under this
rationale, the government could be held to its representations,
including its "hold harmless" representations, if the taxpayer
passed up the opportunity to use business assets or receipts in
reliance thereon. The issue of hold harmless representations
may be academic since the IRS will in most cases allow busi-
ness continuation without making any promises'33 or with
statements confirming the responsible person's continuing lia-
bility.13
b. Representations Regarding the Continuation of Business
After notification to and consultation with the corporate
managers concerning the delinquency in trust fund taxes, the
IRS sometimes postpones pressing its demands for the immedi-
ate payment of unpaid taxes and allows the business to con-
tinue operations. For example, the evidence in Slodov indi-
cated that the IRS advised the petitioner to continue in busi-
ness if he could meet current tax obligations.35 The motivation
may be an effort to prevent increased unemployment in an
economically depressed area 3 ' or a desire to increase the poten-
tial of recovering back taxes. 3' For example, if a corporation
had $20,000 in *net free assets and owed $25,000 for FICA and
income taxes withheld from employees, $7,000 for the em-
"I In Slodov the Supreme Court expressly found that the IRS had not made a
"hold harmless" representation. Slodov v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1778, 1783 (1978).
114 Id. at 1782.
13 Id.
"' See, e.g., Tozier v. United States, 16 A.F.T.R.2d 5626, 5630 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
'' See Slodov v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1778, 1787 (1978).
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ployer's share of FICA taxes, and $50,000 for corporate income
taxes, the IRS might allow continuation of business operations
to maximize its chances of collecting more than $20,000 of the
total tax liability of $82,000. The corporate officers might be
motivated to continue business operations by a desire to pro-
tect their own jobs' as well as the interests of the company's
investors, creditors, clients, and employees.
In Slodov the Supreme Court expressed concern over pen-
alizing the responsible person who continues business opera-
tions for "doing what the Government regards as maximizing
its [the government's] chances for recovery.' 1 39 The Court
thus raises the question of the existence and scope of an author-
ized continuation of business defense to section 6672 liability.
If there is some form of authorized business continuation de-
fense, is it available to both old and new managers?
i. Nature and Scope of Authorized Business Continuation
Defense
In Slodov the Supreme Court held that the responsible
person who acquires a business with a liability for unpaid with-
holding taxes and insufficient withheld funds to pay that liabil-
ity has no personal fault for failing to use after-acquired funds
to pay the tax liability. The lack of a duty to use after-acquired
funds to pay the existing trust fund tax liability means that the
liability of the responsible person with respect to such existing
liabilities will not be increased by his continuation of the busi-
ness. However, business continuation may alter the risk which
the responsible person has with respect to such existing tax
liabilities. For example, if a corporation owed $27,000 in trust
fund taxes and had only $20,000 in available funds, by continu-
ing the business there is a risk that the available funds will be
depleted. Should the risk of loss of the $20,000 be shifted to the
government on the theory that by allowing business continua-
tion there was an implied promise to hold the responsible per-
son harmless for his use of this $20,000 in business operations?
Since both the IRS and the responsible person presumably had
something to gain by continued business operations, at least
,' See United States v. Sotelo, 98 S. Ct. 1795, 1802 n.13 (1978).
In 98 S. Ct. at 1788.
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when the responsible person was the one who decided to con-
tinue operations, it does not appear unfair to leave the risk of
deterioration of the financial condition on the responsible per-
son. But what if the responsible person had been opposed to
business continuation and the decision to continue operations
was made by the owners or other managers? Should the liabil-
ity of the responsible person continue unchanged even though
he had wanted to use the $20,000 to pay part of the trust fund
tax liability and to sell $7,000 of assets to pay the remainder
of the liability? Under such circumstances the taxpayer is not
in fact the responsible person since he could only pay the tax
liability with the consent of another person who refused to
consent. However, if the taxpayer had the power to pay over
the withheld $20,000 when that amount was due, then he would
have been a responsible person at that time.
The fact that the risk assumed by the responsible person
when he failed to withhold or pay over may be altered by cir-
cumstances beyond his control at a later date should not relieve
him of his liability. It is the opinion of this author that the
liability of a responsible person should not be decreased merely
because the IRS allowed business continuation. Risk of finan-
cial deterioration of the business should continue to be shoul-
dered by the responsible person. In this manner the IRS will
be given the greatest flexibility in maximizing the chances of
collecting the unpaid taxes; it may attempt immediate collec-
tion or it may allow business continuation without relieving the
responsible person of his personal liability for his failure to
withhold or pay over trust fund taxes at the appropriate time.
The IRS should be bound by express hold harmless representa-
tions but such promises should not be implied from the mere
authorization to continue business. Interpreted in this manner
the authorized business continuation defense merely restates
the lack of any'duty to pay over after-acquired funds.
That a taxpayer might be misled into believing he is fol-
lowing the proper course after being authorized by the IRS to
continue business operations is not difficult to imagine. Fair-
ness to the taxpayer requires that he be given an express warn-
ing of the nature of the risk he assumes by continuing business
operations. The taxpayer should be warned that he will con-
tinue to be personally liable for the unpaid trust fund taxes to
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the extent he was liable before the agreement with the IRS to
continue business. If the IRS so decides, it should even be
allowed expressly to condition business continuation on the
payment of back taxes out of subsequently acquired, first-
available receipts. However, the attachment of such an express
condition is likely to be a rare occurrence since it would often
lead to immediate business termination.
ii. Applicability to Old and New Managers
The Slodov opinion raises the question of whether author-
ized business continuation should produce different conse-
quences for old managers than for new managers. Specifically,
does the defense apply to protect only responsible persons who
are new managers, i.'e., managers who acceded to control after
net wages were paid and at a time when no funds were avail-
able to pay the back taxes? Or does it apply to protect a contin-
uation of business by the old managers, i.e., those who paid the
net wages?
Clearly, the Supreme Court was not expressly creating an
all-encompassing rule applicable to both old and new managers
in Slodov:
When the same individual or individuals who caused the de-
linquency in any tax quarter are also the 'responsible persons'
at the time the Government's efforts to collect from the em-
ployer have failed and it seeks recourse against the
'responsible employees,' see IRS policy statement P-5-60,
IRS Manual, MT 1218-56, there is no question that § 6672 is
applicable to them. It is the situation that arises when there
has been a change of control of the employer enterprise, here
corporations, prior to the expiration of a tax quarter, or at a
time when a tax delinquency for past quarters already exists
that creates the question for our decision.'40
Nevertheless, the policies supporting the decision require an
extension of the protection afforded in Slodov to old as well as
new managers who continue business operations with the con-
sent of the IRS. The distinctions between old and new manag-
ers are insufficient to warrant differentiating between them for
purposes of section 6672.
1" Id. at 1784.
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The Supreme Court stated two reasons for finding that the
new managers had no personal fault. One was that liability
would discourage changes of ownership and management of
financially troubled corporations."' A second was a wish to
facilitate the infusion of additional outside funds into the busi-
ness.
142
Neither of these arguments offers a sound basis for treating
new managers more favorably than the old managers. Regard-
ing discouragement of changes of management, treating the old
and new managers alike would have a neutral effect. By hold-
ing new managers to less strict standards of liability the deci-
sion appears to encourage changes in management. 43 The
objective should be neither to encourage nor discourage
changes in management. Since both old and new managers can
be responsible persons, identical standards for measuring their
personal fault would have a neutral effect on changes in man-
agement.
That an infusion of equity or debt financing might accom-
pany the change in ownership is not a valid reason for treating
new managers differently from the old. Neither old nor new
managers have an obligation to contribute funds to the busi-
ness.14 It is arguable that by allowing the old managers to
continue the business they might also contribute additional
funds to the business. Furthermore, if the owners are not the
managers of the business, infusion of additional funds by the
owners is as likely to occur with new or old managers. The
Slodov situation is not distinguishable, on these policy
"I See text accompanying note 144 supra.
142 Id.
"1 Finally, there can be little doubt that the Court's ruling today will
result in changes in management and ownership which are in fact nothing
but subterfuges to avoid using the company's funds to pay outstanding trust
fund tax obligations. The investors in any corporation seriously in arrears
will also have a strong incentive to arrange changes of management, whether
sham or real, in order to permit funds acquired by the corporation to be used
for purposes other than satisfying its tax obligations without exposing its
managers to personal liability. In addition, changes of ownership,.often more
formal than real, will frequently be arranged for no purpose other than to
permit the concern to use future funds without regard to its pre-existing tax
obligations.
Slodov v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1778, 1794 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
," Id. at 1788.
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grounds, from the more common situation where the existing
responsible persons are authorized by the IRS to continue the
business operations after notice of the unpaid tax liability.
On the basis of underlying policies, identical standards of
liability should be applied to both old and new managers for
business continuations. However, application of identical stan-
dards of fault will usually have different consequences for each
category of responsible person.
The personal fault of the old managers will usually be
found in the failure to withhold funds or the failure to deposit
or pay over such funds at the applicable due date. Only a non-
willful dissipation of withheld funds between the time taxes
were withheld and the due date for deposit or payover, an
unlikely occurrence, will relieve them of their existing personal
fault."5 New managers, on the other hand, will have no existing
personal fault at the time business continuation is allowed if,
as in Slodov, withheld funds had been depleted before they
assumed control." 6 Thus, old managers usually will already
have personal fault at the time business continuation is al-
lowed but new managers will usually not have such personal
fault. Authorized business continuation should not expand or
diminish the personal fault of old or new managers, thus the
old managers' liability is not relieved and the new managers'
liability is not increased. Of course, if the old managers' per-
sonal fault were excused by a timely non-willful dissipation of
withheld funds, the liability of the old managers should not be
reinstated because he continued business operations. Simi-
larly, if the new managers had personal fault, e.g., withheld
funds were not depleted prior to their accession to control, such
personal fault should not be relieved by authorized business
continuation. Viewed in this manner, the authorized business
continuation defense involves no more than application of the
general principle that there is no personal fault for a failure to
use after-acquired funds to pay off existing trust fund tax lia-
bilities. Although the policy reasoning used by the Supreme
Court to distinguish liability of old and new managers is not
sound, application of the after-acquired funds doctrine to old
10 See notes 112-19 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the depletion
of funds.
141 Id.
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and new managers will usually result in differences in liability
of such persons.
c. Failure of the IRS to Attempt to Collect Taxes from the
Employer
The failure of the IRS to attempt to collect the back taxes
from corporate assets does not relieve the responsible person
from liability."7 Even when the responsible person requests
that the IRS seize assets in the hands of third persons, the
courts have concluded that "this defense that the IRS has a
duty to act as a collection agency for the defendant is without
merit." '148 The ultimate rejection of this defense is illustrated by
Teel v. United States, in which liability remained despite the
failure of the IRS to exercise the priority of its lien over the
assets of the corporation in a receivership proceeding.",
To be consistent with Slodov's concept of personal fault,
the failure of the IRS to attempt to collect the unpaid taxes
from corporate assets in bankruptcy or receivership should be
"I Monday v. United States, 421 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821
(1970) (IRS failed to attempt collection of accounts receivable); Datlof v. United
States, 370 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1966); Cash v. Campbell, 346 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1965);
Spiegal v. United States, 16 A.F.T.R.2d 5667 (N.D. Ga. 1965). But cf. Tozier v. United
States, 16 A.F.T.R.2d 5626 (W.D. Wash. 1965) (IRS released property which it had
previously levied and attached).
I" United States v. DeBeradinis, 395 F. Supp. 944, 953 (D. Conn. 1975).
" 529 F.2d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 1976). Cf. Spivak v. United States, 370 F.2d 612 (2d
Cir. 1967) (taxpayer held liable even though the IRS compromised its claim during
bankruptcy proceedings for the corporation since taxpayer had notice of the proposed
compromise and failed to object); Bernardi v. United States, 33 A.F.T.R.2d 74-523
(N.D. Ill. 1973) (dicta that responsible person is not relieved from liability even if the
IRS does not use due diligence in bankruptcy proceeding since liability of responsible
person is distinct from liability of corporation). Characterization of liability of the
responsible person as distinct from that of the corporation fails to recognize that the
duty to attempt collection is owed by the IRS to both the corporation and the responsi-
ble person.
Liability of a responsible person should not be based merely on the fact that assets
were transferred to a receiver in bankruptcy before they had been liquidated by the
responsible person to pay the trust fund tax liability. After-acquired funds are not
impressed with a trust, see note 122 supra, and thus § 6672 liability arguably must be
based upon a failure to withhold cash or its equivalent, or a misapplication of such
withheld funds. If neither of these duties have been breached the responsible person
should not be liable under § 6672 - even if the withheld funds were transferred to a
receiver before payment to the IRS. In Slodov, the IRS conceded and the Supreme
Court agreed that the responsible person does not have a duty "to liquidate corporate
assets to satisfy the tax obligations." 98 S. Ct. at 1788-89.
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a valid defense under section 6672. The policy allowing the IRS
a flexible approach in determining how best to maximize tax
collections is no longer applicable after the business is in the
process of dissolution.'50 While the responsible person may be
at fault for his failure to withhold, collect, or pay over,'"' the
government exhibits greater fault in not taking advantage of its
last chance to collect from corporate assets in bankruptcy.
The stated 'policy of the IRS is that "[t]he 100% penalty
will be asserted against responsible officers and employees of
the corporation only if such taxes cannot be collected from the
corporation itself.' 5 2 Thus, the IRS violates its own policy
when it attempts to ambush the corporate officers with section
6672 personal liability rather than collect from the corporation.
As a practical matter, it would be difficult to ground an estop-
pel defense to section 6672 liability on this policy since very few
responsible persons will know of its existence and be able to
claim reliance on it. However, there is a sufficient connection
between the inaction by the IRS and the taxpayer's nonpay-
ment of taxes to warrant estoppel in this case. The IRS policy.
statement reflects the reasonable expectation of taxpayers: the
expectation that the IRS will not consciously let the corporate
assets get beyond its reach and then punish the taxpayer with
personal liability. Although most taxpayers presumably do not
know about the IRS policy statement, they probably do rely on
a belief that the IRS will attempt to collect the unpaid taxes
from the corporation's assets after those assets are beyond the
control of the responsible person and the corporation is in the
process of dissolution.
Nonpayment of taxes with the reasonable expectation that
those taxes will be collected out of corporate assets (assuming
there are sufficient assets available) is no more a "willful"
nonpayment than would be the delivery of cash to a clerk to
pay the taxes where the clerk later absconds with the funds. In
" The responsible person's defense to liability for the government's failure to
collect from corporate assets prior to bankruptcy or receivership must be based on
express representations of the IRS. See text accompanying note 130 supra and discus-
sion of authorized business continuation at text accompanying notes 135-46 supra.
"' Teel v. United States, 529 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1976).
,5z IRS Policy Statement P-5-60 (MT 1218-56, approved Nov. 5, 1965), reprinted
in 1 (C.C.H.) I.R.M. 130-25, -26.
[Vol. 67
HIDDEN TAX TRAP
neither case would the nonpayment be willful because in nei-
ther case would nonpayment be intentional.
Responsible persons are advised to liquidate corporate as-
sets and pay all past due tax liabilities prior to transferring any
assets to a receiver, even though they may have no such duty.
The IRS may fail to assert the priority of its liens in bankruptcy
and such failure by the IRS may not relieve the responsible
person of his liability. Even if the IRS does assert the priority
of its liens, the claims for unpaid taxes withheld from employ-
ees' wages will often be merely a fourth priority claim in bank-
ruptcy.153
III. SUGGESTED REFORMS
A. Application of Tax Payments
The current practice of the IRS is to apply tax payments
and collections against non-trust fund tax liabilities before
applying them to trust fund liabilities.' Courts have sustained
this exercise of discretion on the grounds that the IRS is merely
attempting to maximize tax collections by not relieving respon-
sible persons of their liability under section 6672.111 Only in the
case of timely payments accompanied by written directions
regarding application of funds will the IRS apply those pay-
ments against trust fund tax liabilities."' One consequence of
these allocation policies is that persons familiar with the tax
laws may make timely payment with appropriate instructions
and thereby eliminate their personal liability under section
6672. Less conniving taxpayers, unaware of the operation of
section 6672 and IRS allocation policies, might pay much larger
total amounts and yet fail to extinguish any of their liability
under section 6672. It is possible that a taxpayer who has been
'" See generally J. MoORE & L. KING, supra note 6, at § 64(A).
25 See Slodov v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1778, 1788 n.15 (1978); Kalb v. United
States, 505 F.2d 506, 509 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 979 (1976); Liddon v.
United States, 448 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 981 (1971); Monday
v. United States, 421 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970); Hirsch v.
United States, 306 F. Supp. 170, 172-73 (S.D. Ohio 1975); United States v. DeBeradi-
nis, 395 F. Supp. 944, 952 (D. Conn. 1975).
'" See O'Dell v. United States, 326 F.2d 451, 456 (10th Cir. 1964); Hirsch v.
United States, 306 F. Supp. 170, 173 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
H" See, e.g., United States v. DeBeradinis, 395 F. Supp. 944, 952 (D. Conn. 1975).
See also cases cited in note 154 supra.
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authorized to continue business operations by the IRS will pay
over trust fund taxes on current wages and that the IRS will
apply those payments to past due taxes, trust fund or other-
wise. 157
All tax payments and collections, including late payments
and enforced collections, should be applied first against trust
fund tax. liabilities. Even though the amounts paid or collected
may not be traceable to "trust funds,"'58 it is an unreasonable
exercise of discretion by the IRS to allocate these receipts to
non-trust fund tax liabilities for several reasons. Congress has
singled out the employee's share of taxes on wages for special
treatment because of the alleged importance of collecting such
taxes. This importance reinforces the idea that tax payments
should be applied to trust fund liabilities first. Also, such ap-
plication would eliminate the distinction between those aware
of section 6672 and those unaware. Finally, in the case of IRS
authorization to continue business operations, application of
trust fund taxes from current wages to past due taxes violates
the section 7501 trust concept. When the IRS allocates receipts
to non-trust fund tax liabilities, the nonpayment of the trust
fund taxes is caused more by the IRS allocation method than
by the personal fault of the responsible person.
B. Suggested Legislative Changes
Wage and employment tax withholding is an integral part
of our self-assessment system of taxation. For fiscal year 1977,
withheld income and F.I.C.A. taxes comprised approximately
fifty percent of gross Internal Revenue Collections. 5 ' Withheld
income taxes constituted about eighty percent of individual
income tax collections."' Arguably, withheld taxes are different
from other taxes. The Social Security Law requires that the
" See Slodov v. United States, 98 S. Ct. at 1788 n.15.
I" Actual tracing of funds is required in determining priorities of creditors regard-
ing the § 7501 trust fund. See id.; United States v. Randall, 410 U.S. 513, 517 (1971).
... COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ANN. REP. 14 (1977). Gross Internal Reve-
nue collections in 1977 were about $355 billion, corporate income taxesA0 billion,
individual income taxes $187 billion, F.I.C.A. taxes $78 billion, and other taxes $30
billion. The total withheld from employees' wages was $184 billion, composed of $145
billion withheld income taxes and $39 billion F.I.C.A. taxes. Id.
I" Id. Withheld taxes accounted for about 83% of total individual income tax
collection in 1976. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ANN. REP. 137 (1976).
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employee be given credit for F.I.C.A. earnings regardless of
whether the F.I.C.A. tax was collected.'61 Employees can get
refunds of income taxes withheld from their wages even if such
withheld amounts are not paid to the government by the em-
ployer.'
Assuming the withholding system is a necessary compo-
nent of our tax system, section 6672 would appear to be a useful
tool in implementing the withholding system. Fear of personal
liability for nonpayment of withheld taxes should induce com-
pliance with the duty to withhold and pay over such taxes. The
problem with section 6672 is that it does not create fear of
personal liability, often because taxpayers do not know about
section 6672 or because they believe the business will produce
sufficient funds in the future to pay this liability. The Trust
Fund Compliance Program' 3 of the IRS does help place the
responsible person on notice of delinquencies in this handling
of trust fund taxes. The warning could be made even more
effective by including express notification of section 6672 liabil-
ity to responsible persons. In addition, better publicity of the
section 6672 penalty by the IRS to responsible persons is
needed before any delinquency occurs.
Ambiguity in sections 3102(a) and 3402(a) as to precisely
what must be withheld 1"4 is partially responsible for the
hidden-trap nature of section 6672 liability. If the duty to with-
hold is to be treated as a duty to withhold cash or its equiva-
lent, then the statute should expressly so state, rather than
leaving the interpretation of the duty to withhold to be drawn
by inference from decided cases and regulations.
"I Benefits are based, in part, on earnings. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 414, 415 (1976).
Earnings include amounts deducted from employees' wages. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1026(c),
.801 (1978).
" I.R.C. § 31 states "[tihe amount withheld under section 3402 as tax on the
wages of any individual shall be allowed to the recipient of the income as a credit
against the tax imposed by this subtitle." Treas. Reg. § 1.31-1 (1960) says that "[i]f
the tax has actually been withheld at the source, credit or refund shall be made to the
recipient of the income even though such tax has not been paid over to the Government
by the employer." Dicta in several cases support the regulations. Moore v. United
States, 465 F.2d 514, 517 (5th Cir. 1972); Dillard v. Patterson, 326 F.2d 302, 304 (5th
Cir. 1963); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 118, 120 (10th
Cir. 1952).
" MS 5(10)G-22 (approved Feb. 6, 1976), reprinted in 4 (C.C.H.) I.R.M. 24,069-
21.
" See text accompanying note 94 supra for a discussion of this ambiguity.
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The lack of any duty to segregate withheld "funds" con-
tributes further to the problem of unawareness. Accepted ac-
counting practice is consistent with the interpretation of the
duty to collect and withhold as a duty merely to avoid paying
withheld amounts to the employee rather than requiring fund-
ing pf the liability with cash or its equivalent."5 When a corpo-
ration pays wages it often simply makes an accounting entry
charging the wage expense account for the gross wages, credits
cash for the net wages paid, and credits a payables account to
reflect the unpaid tax liability.166 Generally, no separate fund
is created; no cash or other assets are earmarked for payment
of the withheld amounts. A responsible person could hardly be
expected to know that he had "willfully" failed to collect and
withhold taxes on wages paid at this time since the accounting
records suggest he has done all he is required to do.
Arguably, current accounting practices are deficient in
that they fail to reflect a duty to actually withhold "cash or its
equivalent." Accountants could footnote the cash account or
make an entry reflecting a transfer of cash from the general
cash account to a special withheld tax funds account. Such an
entry on the books, without any segregation of actual funds,
would reflect the duty to withhold cash or its equivalent with-
out earmarking specific dollars for the payment of that liabil-
ity. However, making such a bookkeeping entry without the
segregation of actual funds still exposes the responsible person
to the risk that he will look to the bank statement to determine
available cash for payment of other creditors and inadvertently
expend the trust fund. The requirement of segregation of actual
funds at the time wages are paid would inform the responsible
person of his duty to collect and withhold funds at that time
and would also eliminate the possibilities of an expenditure of
such withheld funds. Even though there is no duty to segregate
withheld funds at this time, accountants should advise their
clients to transfer funds into a separate bank account entitled
"Withheld taxes-trust fund account" at the time payrolls are
prepared.
1 "Amounts withheld from employees by law or by agreement give rise to liability
accounts which substitute for the amount that would otherwise have been paid to the
worker." S. DAVIDSON, HANDBOOK OF MODERN AccOUNTING 24-9 (chapter by L. Vance
1970).
11, Id. at 24-9.
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Imposition of a duty to segregate withheld tax funds at the
time wages are paid should further the congressional purpose
of assuring the collection of trust fund taxes without imposing
a substantial burden on employers, the IRS, or responsible
persons. Since the employer and responsible person presuma-
bly have a duty not to reduce cash below the liability for with-
held taxes, imposition of a duty to earmark specific dollars or
other assets to meet that obligation should not appreciably
affect the cash flow of business. The imposition of a duty to
segregate is also consistent with the section 7501 trust concept
and the fact that the "trust" is not recognized unless the trac-
ing requirement is satisfied. Such a duty will go a long way
toward the elimination of the hidden-trap nature of section
6672.
CONCLUSION
Applications of section 6672, as currently interpreted,
often impose a harsh penalty on morally innocent and unsus-
pecting business managers. The harshness of that penalty is
highlighted by the Supreme Court's decision that such penal-
ties are non-dischargeable in the personal bankruptcy of the
responsible person. ' Although the decision in Slodov does
make "personal fault" a prerequisite to finding "willfulness,"
it is likely that the personal fault concept will not, in most
cases, provide different results than would the prior interpreta-
tions of willfulness.
In addition to the emphasis given to the concept of per-
sonal fault, Slodov is important for suggesting a theoretical
framework for analysis of the duties of a responsible person.
The lack of a duty to pay over after-acquired funds is consistent
with an apparent interpretation of the statutory scheme as
requiring the responsible person to withhold funds equal to the
liability for withheld taxes when wages are paid.
At the present time, the exact status of this duty is un-
clear. Reform is badly needed to inform responsible persons of
their duties. Section 6672 will continue to fall short of its in-
tended purpose until the persons subject to liability are made
aware of their duties. This awareness should be provided, in
part, by congressional action.
" United States v. Sotelo, 98 S. Ct. 1795 (1978).
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